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Abstract
We set up a model of land-use and irrigation water choices to assess the impact
of dry weather conditions and possible restriction policies on farmers' payos in the
Beauce area in France. Given the informational context, we construct a dynamic two-
period model in which farmers make conjectures on the water abstraction by other
users and take into account variations in the height of the water-table. We solve
the problem using dynamic programming. We simulate dierent restriction policies,
proposed in the literature and tested in the eld. We show that these restrictions,
although ecient with respect to hydrological criteria, result in serious economic losses
for the farmers.
Keywords: groundwater management; hydro-agro-economic model; dynamic program-
ming; irrigation; Beauce aquifer.
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1 Introduction
In the second half of the 20th century, the increasing use of tube wells and mechanical
pumps has led to signicant groundwater depletion in many parts of the world (Shah et
al. 2007). With the help of irrigation, high performance agricultural production areas
have been created above aquifers, contributing to the growing pressure on groundwater
resources (Shah et al. 2007). As a consequence, water managers need to counteract
dropping groundwater levels to secure water for other uses as well as for future generations.
To do so, they may rely on institutions (Ostrom 1990), regulatory tools (Pérez-Blanco and
Gómez 2014) or economic instruments, such as pricing and water markets (see for example
Easter et al. 1999, Koundouri 2004).
In this article, we focus on the Beauce area, one of the most important agricultural
production regions in France, and one of the biggest cereal producing regions in Europe.
Not only is the Beauce aquifer a typical example of an aquifer depleted by individual
pumping for irrigation, but it is also an interesting example because of the restriction
policies already in place. Restrictions in the Beauce area are proportional reductions in
farmers' individual quotas and are contingent on the aquifer level. Less precipitation
and increasing water demand may render potentially drastic restriction policies necessary
(Lejars et al. 2012a,c). The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of dierent
restriction policies on farmers' land allocation and irrigation decisions under dry weather
conditions.
Similar to the work of Madani and Dinar 2012, we make rather unusual but realis-
tic assumptions about the informational context in which farmers take their decisions.
Concerning the time horizon, farmers are assumed to be neither completely myopic, i.e.
maximizing their instantaneous welfare, nor completely farsighted, i.e. taking the long-
term outcomes of payos and resources into account. Concerning the actions of other
resource users, they are neither completely smart, i.e. learning about the behavior of other
users, nor are they completely ignorant of other resource users' water abstractions.1
Completely myopic agents justify the use of static models, and such agents have been
extensively used in programming models explaining optimal crop choices (see for example
Howitt 1995, Heckelei 2002, Heckelei and Wol 2003, Graveline et al. 2012 or Graveline
and Mérel 2014). Good knowledge of future changes in the resource and farsighted agents
justify the use of dynamic resource models, explaining the optimal choice of water use over
1Madani and Dinar distinguish four possible types of behavior in a non-cooperative common pool
resource (CPR) management problem. They state: "ignorant myopic management and smart non-myopic
management institutions reect two extreme cases of anti-ideal and ideal types of users, respectively. Based
on the current conditions of the CPRs in practice,[...] it is reasonable to claim that most CPR users adopt
the institutions which are in between the two extremes".
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time, and have been extensively used in the resource economics literature (see for example
Burt 1967, Gisser and Sánchez 1980, Roseta-Palma 2002, Moreaux and Reynaud 2006, or
De Frutos Cachorro et al. 2014).2
In this paper, we construct a model in which farmers choose crop allocation and irriga-
tion water volumes. Individual farmers do not consider long-term changes in the resource
and are therefore modelled as decision makers with a limited planning horizon. However,
when taking their decisions in spring, farmers consider the potential impact of restrictions
not only on the spring crop but also on the summer crop. They are hence farsighted over
two periods. In addition, farmers in the Beauce area can observe the level of the resource
and make conjectures about the total abstraction volume made by other resource users,
based on information from the previous years. In contrast to other hydro-economic models
in the literature (see for example Britz et al. 2013, Erfani et al. 2014), we presume the
farmers have imperfect information on other users' actions but do make some best guesses
about their water abstractions. In addition, there is no formal water market that can
adjust water demand and supply (but see Erfani et al. 2014 for a model including water
markets). Because farmers are somewhat farsighted when restrictions are in place and
because they can monitor changes in the resource over the year, we construct a dynamic
two-period hydro-agro-economic model.
Situated south-west of Paris, the Beauce aquifer extends over 9700 km2 (see Lejars et
al. 2012b). With less than 600 mm of rainfall per year, it is one of the driest regions
in France (see Lejars et al. 2012b). As a consequence, about 50% of the agricultural
land is irrigated (MAAF 2012), mainly with water from the aquifer. The aquifer is also a
crucial resource for drinking water in the region. The management of the Beauce aquifer is
therefore an important issue that has been addressed through several governance schemes.
In particular, since 1995, irrigation restrictions depend on the state of the aquifer and since
1999, individual irrigation quotas have been introduced, which are adjusted every spring
through a reduction coecient calculated as a function of the state of the aquifer.3
Future weather conditions may render drastic restrictions necessary. This is why Lejars
et al. 2012c discussed the potential impact of restrictions representing 40% and 70% of
quota in force today. In this paper, we rst assess how the farmers adjust to dry weather
conditions and what this implies for the aquifer. We then introduce restrictions of 20%,
40 % and 70 % of individual quotas under dry conditions in our model. While Lejars et
2Other dynamic models exist, e.g. on reservoir management (see for example Vedula and Nagesh Kumar
1996 or Evers et al. 1998), or on the dynamics of agricultural yields (see for example Reynaud 2009 or
Knapp and Schwabe 2008), but they do not deal with groundwater management and particularly with the
consequence of a drop in the height of the water-table for the cost of extraction.
3The aquifer has an average stock of 20 billion m3 but has been subject to quite high inter-annual
variations over the last 30 years (see Coz 2000).
3
Author-produced version of the article published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2016, N°44(1), p.99-120.
The original publication is available at http://erae.oxfordjournals.org
Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbw005
al. (2012c) studied such restrictions in focus groups with farmers, we test the impact of
such restrictions in an analytical model. Similar stringent restrictions have been found
to be necessary in other regions of Europe. For example, Pérez-Blanco and Gómez 2014
reported that drought management plans in the Guadalquivir river basin in Spain lead to
restrictions of 30% when the drought alert index is reached and up to 70% in emergency
situations. Our study shows that, although restrictions are ecient in preserving water-
table levels, they result in serious economic losses for farmers, representing almost one
third of gross annual value added in the most extreme scenario.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the hydro-agro-economic
model and the solution approach we use. In Section 3, we describe the existing data and the
transformations we undertook to be able to apply the model to the Beauce study area. We
model choices of a representative farm specialized in eld crops and sugar beet production,
which is one of the four main farm types in the study area. We estimate the water response
of the underlying yield functions. We also consider how yield responses and water-use by
competitive sectors change, depending on weather conditions. In Section 4, we present
the baseline-case, a normal year corresponding to 2010, and results for dierent scenarios,
namely a dry year with no policy intervention, and four policy-scenarios, in which quotas
and restrictions are used to cope with dry conditions. In Section 5, we discuss the impact
of some key parameters of our model. Finally, in Section 6 we present our conclusions and
ideas for further research.
2 A Model of Irrigation and Land-Use Choice
2.1 The Model
We consider a two-period and k-crop model for a representative farm with a surface area
S. We call t = 0 the rst time period (spring) and t = 1 the second time period (summer)
for which decisions are taken. At the beginning of spring, the farmer chooses the share of
land, αk(t), with 0 ≤ αk(t) ≤ 1 and the (per hectare) irrigation water volume, wk(t), for
each crop k and each period t. These are the decision variables. M represents the number
of representative farmers in the study area, which covers a total surface area of Sb hectares.
These farmers share the same aquifer, which is described by the height of the water-table,
H(t), which is the state variable. The water-table changes as a function of all the farmers'
irrigation decisions (see equation (5)). In the following, we describe all the parameters and
variables of the model which are also described in table 1.4
4For the sake of simplicity, whenever possible, we suppress the time indicator in the following.
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Name Description
S Mean surface area of representative farm
αk Share of surface area of crop k (decision variable)
wk Water volume (per hectare) used for crop k (decision variable)
H Water-table height (state variable)
yk Yield water response (per hectare) of crop k
ak Coecient 1 of yield water response of crop k
bk Coecient 2 of yield water response of crop k
xk Intercept of yield water response of crop k
pk Price of crop k
cok Operating expenses (per hectare) for crop k
cpk Pumping costs (per hectare) for crop k
dk Coecient 1 of operating expenses for crop k
ek Coecient 2 of operating expenses for crop k
z Cost parameter for maximum pumping height
c Unit energy cost per volume pumped
π Gross value added (per period) for representative farm
β Discount rate
w̃ Total volume of irrigation water for representative farm
wj Irrigation water used by all other types of farms
wo Water for other uses than irrigation
W Total water extractions for all water uses
M Number of representative farms
r Net average recharge in one period
σ Return ow coecient
γ Withdrawal coecient
η Aquifer stock coecient
Sb Total surface are of study area
H0 Initial height of water-table
ᾱ Share of surface are used for summer crop
w̄ Minimum amount of water applied to the summer crop
Table 1: List of Variables and Parameters
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First, the (per hectare) yield response to water, yk, for each crop, is given by:
yk(wk) = akwk − bkw2k + xk, (1)
where ak, bk and xk are positive parameters.
Each farmer aims to maximize the present value of gross values added,
∑
t β
tπ(t), given
the price for each crop, pk, the discount rate, β, and variable costs. For per hectare variable
costs, we distinguish operating expenses, cok, which depend on the share of surface area
allocated to each crop, from pumping costs, cpk, which depend on the water-table height
and on the per hectare water volume used for each crop. Hence:
cok(αk) = dkαk +
ek
2
α2k, (2)
cpk(wk, H) = (z − cH)wk, (3)
where dk and ek are positive parameters of operating expenses, and z and c positive
parameters of the cost of pumping. In particular, the quadratic form of operating expenses
is due to implicit management costs associated with a given land allocation. As shown by
Carpentier and Letort 2012, quadratic costs occur because of the constraints associated
with quasi-xed inputs (machinery and labor peak loads) and crop rotations (see also
Heckelei and Wol 2003). Concerning the pumping cost function, z measures the marginal
costs of maximum possible lift and c the unit energy cost (see for example Gisser and
Sánchez 1980). Thus, Gross Value Added in period t is given by:
π(t) =
∑
k
S
{
αk(t)
[
pkyk(wk(t))− cpk(wk(t), H(t))
]
− cok(αk(t))
}
. (4)
The water-table height decreases with total extractions,W , corrected by the withdrawal
coecient γ, and increases according to the return ow coecient σ and the net recharge
over the period concerned, r(t). The storage capacity of the aquifer is represented by the
surface area of the study area, Sb and the aquifer stock coecient, η. The height of the
water-table in the second period thus depends on the height of the water-table in the rst
period in the following way:
H(t+ 1) = H(t) +
r(t)− (1− σ)γW (t)
ηSb
, t = 0, 1. (5)
Total extractions are the sum of extractions by representative farms and other extractions:
W (t) = Mw̃(t) + wj(t) + wo(t), (6)
with
w̃(t) = S
∑
k
αk(t)wk(t), (7)
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the total water volume used by each farmer, wj(t) irrigation water volumes of non-representative
farms and wo(t) water extraction for other uses, namely drinking water and industrial uses.
We consider that the representative farm does not know the value added of the other
players who share the aquifer. However, the farmer guesses the volume used by other water
users, for example, based on the total amount of water used in a previous agricultural
campaign. Finally, we assume that the value of the resource at the end of the planning
horizon, V (H(2)), is constant. This means that the implicit price of the water resource at
that time is zero. The farmer's planning horizon is indeed only one agricultural campaign
with two irrigation periods and the value of water at the end of these seasons is nil for the
production process considered here.
The general problem for the representative farmer is hence the following:
V (H0) = max
{αk(t)≥0,wk(t)≥0}
∑
t
βtπ(t) s.t. (1) to (7) with (8)
H(0) = H0, V (H(2)) = VT (constant), and
∑
k
αk = 1. (9)
We use the dynamic programming principle to solve the problem. Consequently, we
have to solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
V (H(t)) = max
{αk(t)≥0,wk(t)≥0}
π(t) + βV (H(t+ 1)),
where,
H(t+ 1) = H(t) +
r(t)− (1− σ)γ
[
M
∑
k αk(t)Swk(t) + w
j(t) + wo(t)
]
ηSB
, t = 0, 1.
π(t) described in (4) and constraints (9) above.
2.2 A Simpler Case
In the following, we consider a simpler case representing a typical situation in the Beauce
area. We use a model with three crops, of which two are grown in spring. Because there
is only one main summer crop, which is grown on a contractually xed proportion of land,
in the following, we assume the case where the share of the summer crop is xed. The
contract also implies that the summer crop cannot be grown without a minimum amount
of irrigation. Hence, we have:
α1(0) ≥ 0, α2(0) ≥ 0, α3(1) = ᾱ,
and consequently:
w1(0) ≥ 0, w2(0) ≥ 0, w3(1) ≥ w̄,
and
α1(1) = α2(1) = α3(0) = w1(1) = w2(1) = w3(0) = 0.
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2.2.1 Land Use and Water Volumes in Summer
We can now solve the dynamic programming problem using backward induction. As
V (H(2)) = VT (constant), we have:
π(1) = Sᾱ(p3(x3 + a3w3(1)− b3w3(1)2)− d3 − zw3(1) + cH(1)w3(1))− S
e3
2
ᾱ2 (10)
We rst solve
V (H(1)) = max
w3(1)
π(1) + βVT .
The necessary condition of optimality is:
∂π(1)
∂w3(1)
= 0⇔ Sᾱ(p3a3 − 2p3b3w3(1)− z + cH(1)) = 0 (11)
hence:
w3(1) =
p3a3 − z + cH(1)
2p3b3
, (12)
with
H(1) = H0 +
r(0)− (1− σ)γ(MS(α1(0)w1(0) + α2(0)w2(0)) + wj(0) + wo(0))
SBη
,
and α2(0) = 1− α1(0)− ᾱ. (13)
Note that p3a3 − 2p3b3w3(1) is the marginal benet derived from the summer crop and
z− cH(1) is the marginal cost of water-use in summer. Hence, equation (12) describes the
optimal irrigation water choice as the one that equalizes marginal benet and marginal
costs for the summer crop. Moreover, given the relation between the water table and
irrigation water-use (see equation (13)), marginal costs for water use in summer depend on
the optimal irrigation water choice in spring. Substituting (12) and (13) in (10), we can
compute the maximum value of the resource in summer as a function of the choices made
in spring:
V (H(1)) = π∗(1) + βVT . (14)
2.2.2 Land Use and Water Volumes in Spring
Next, we maximize the value of the resource in spring in t = 0. We have to solve:
V (H(0)) = max
α1(0)
w1(0),w2(0)
π(0) + βV (H(1))
with
π(0) = Sα1(0)(p1(x1 + a1w1(0)− b1w1(0)2)− d1 − zw1(0) + cH0w1(0))− S
e1
2
α1(0)
2
+S(1−α1(0)−ᾱ)(p2(x2+a2w2(0)−b2w2(0)2)−d2−zw2(0)+cH0w2(0))−S
e2
2
(1−α1(0)−ᾱ)2,
(15)
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and V (H(1)) described in (14). One necessary condition of optimality is:
∂π(0)
∂α1(0)
+ β
∂π(1)∗
∂α1(0)
= 0⇔ P (1)− P (2) + β ∂π(1)
∗
∂α1(0)
= 0, (16)
with P(1) and P(2) the value added from crops 1 and 2:
P (1) = Sp1(x1 + a1w1(0)− b1w21(0))− Sd1 − Szw1(0) + ScH0w1(0)− Se1α1(0), (17)
P (2) = Sp2(x2+a2w2(0)−b2w22(0))−Sd2−Szw2(0)+ScH0w2(0)−Se2(1−ᾱ−α1(0)). (18)
Equation (16) describes the optimal share of land-use used for crop 1 in spring. Notice
that this solution depends on the dierence between the gains from crop 1 (equation (17))
and crop 2 (equation (18)) and the impact of the choice of land-use in spring, α1(0), on
the discounted value of the resource in summer β ∂π
∗(1)
∂α1(0)
(see (14)). Clearly, the greater the
dierence between the gains obtained from crop 1 and 2, and/or the smaller the irrigation
volume used in summer, the greater the share chosen for crop 1.
The other conditions for a maximum are:
∂π(0)
δw1(0)
+ β
∂π(1)∗
∂w1(0)
= 0⇔ Sα1(0)(p1a1 − 2p1b1w1(0)− z + cH0) + β
∂π(1)∗
∂w1(0)
= 0, (19)
∂π(0)
∂w2(0)
+ β
∂π(1)∗
∂w2(0)
= 0⇔ Sα2(0)(p2a2 − 2p2b2w2(0)− z + cH0) + β
∂π(1)∗
∂w2(0)
= 0. (20)
Following equations (19) and (20), optimal irrigation water volumes for crop 1 (crop 2
respectively) depend on the share of land used for crop 1 (crop 2), the dierence between
marginal benets and costs of water use for crop 1 (crop 2) and the value of the resource
in summer given the irrigation water choice for crop 1 (crop 2) in spring.
We have a system of three equations: (16), (19) and (20), with three unknowns which
we can therefore determine and nd α∗1(0), w
∗
1(0) and w
∗
2(0). Finally, we have to substitute
α∗1(0), w
∗
1(0) and w
∗
2(0) in equation (12) to nd w
∗
3(1) the optimal irrigation water choice
for crop 3.
At this point, we have only described the optimal interior solution of the problem. In
order to take into account corner solutions, we need to consider dierent cases, depending
on whether or not water use quotas and restrictions are implemented (see table 2). Quotas
reduce the total water amount available. They can be reduced by a coecient ω (0 < ω ≤
1), depending on the water-table level at the beginning of the irrigation season. Without
quotas or restrictions, we have to consider the 15 cases in Table 2. If quotas and restrictions
are implemented, we have to consider the additional constraint
Sα1w1 + Sα2w2 + Sᾱw3 = ωX (21)
for all cases, except cases 9, 14, 15 and the specic reduction coecient. The optimum is
given by the solution (corner or interior solutions) that maximizes V(H(0)).
9
Author-produced version of the article published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2016, N°44(1), p.99-120.
The original publication is available at http://erae.oxfordjournals.org
Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbw005
Cases Values
Case 1 α1 = 0 =⇒ w1 = 0
Case 2 α2 = 0 =⇒ w2 = 0
Case 3 w1 = 0
Case 4 w2 = 0
Case 5 w3 = w̄
Case 6 w1 = w2 = 0
Case 7 w1 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Case 8 w2 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Case 9 w1 = w2 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Case 10 w1 = w2 = α1 = 0
Case 11 w1 = w2 = α2 = 0
Case 12 w1 = α1 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Case 13 w2 = α2 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Case 14 w1 = w2 = α1 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Case 15 w1 = w2 = α2 = 0 and w3 = w̄
Table 2: Possible Corner Solutions.
3 Data on the Beauce Area
Our study area, the "Central Beauce" area, which was dened by Lejars et al. 2012b,
occupies an area of 300 600 ha of agricultural land and can be considered as representative
of the whole Beauce region in terms of farm types. The Beauce region is one of the driest
regions in France, with less than 600 mm rainfall per year. More than half the farms
depend on individual water extractions from the Beauce aquifer. Since 1999, the aquifer
has a well-established volumetric management system consisting in individual irrigation
quotas, which are adjusted each year by a reduction coecient as a function of water-table
levels and are communicated to farmers at the beginning of the irrigation season, (see Petit
2002). Farmers can observe the water-table level in their wells or they can learn about the
water-table level from the water-basin manager and ocial statistics. In addition, each
spring, they are informed whether additional restrictions will be introduced in the region.
Whether restrictions apply or not depends on the level of the aquifer. Severe restrictions
apply when the crisis threshold is reached and some restrictions may even apply earlier,
when the alert threshold is reached. In 2010, the crisis threshold was at 110.75 m NGF5,
the alert threshold at 112.19 m NGF. Relatively high variability of water-table levels led to
variations in restrictions ranging from 4.5% to 55% from 1999 to the present (see Bouarfa
5Nivellement Général de la France (NGF) or General Levelling of France is the ocial levelling measure.
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et al. 2011 or Lejars et al. 2012c). In the future, severe restrictions could be necessary
under certain climate change assumptions (Lejars et al. 2012c). Following Lejars et al.,
we test restrictions corresponding to 40% and 70% reductions in individual quotas.
In what follows, we describe the agronomic, hydro-geological and economic data we use
to inform our model of irrigation and land-use choice. Our baseline case is the year 2010,
which corresponds to a year with normal precipitation in the study area. We also consider
a scenario of a dry year, with and without restrictions on irrigation water use, for which
some of the parameters change.
3.1 Agronomic Data
3.1.1 Types of Farms
Based on RGA6 land-use data in 2010, Lejars et al. 2012a,b,c, identied four types of eld
crop farms in the study area. All of them cultivate over 45% of winter crops (mainly wheat)
but dier from each other in the spring or summer crops in which they specialize: sugar
beet in the rst group, rapeseed in the second, special crops in the third, and maize in the
fourth. Here, we focus on the most common type of farm in our study area, which accounts
for 679 farmers specialized in eld-crops and sugar beet. Land-use of the representative
eld crops sugar beet farm consists mainly of winter cereals, winter barley and sugar beet,
with 48%, 17% and 16% of the land-use share respectively. The general agronomic data is
available in the rst part of table 3 and Figure 1.
Figure 1: Representative eld crops sugar beets farms in the study area.
6The General Agricultural Census (French acronym RGA for Recensement Général de l'Agriculture)
is a survey conducted every ten years that updates knowledge of the farming sector: number of farms,
allocation of farm land...
11
Author-produced version of the article published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2016, N°44(1), p.99-120.
The original publication is available at http://erae.oxfordjournals.org
Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbw005
Parameters Description Unit Value
S Surface area of representative farm ha 122
M Number of representative sugar beet farms unitless 679
ᾱ Share of surface area used for summer crop unitless 0.16
w̄ Minimum amount of water applied to the summer crop m3/ha 1 300
γ Withdrawal coecient unitless 1.1
σ Return ow coecient unitless 0
η Aquifer storage coecient unitless 0.08
wo Water for other uses than irrigation million m3 13.78
wjp Water needs by other farms in spring 106 m3 78
wjs Water needs by other farms in summer 106 m3 50
Sb Total surface area of study area km
2 3 006.6
H0 Initial water-table height m 92.81
r Net recharge in summer and spring m3/season 0
p1 Price crop 1 (soft wheat) e/ton 109
p2 Price crop 2 (barley) e/ton 95.85
p3 Price crop 3 (sugar beet) e/ton 25.41
d1 Coe 1 operat. expenses crop 1 e/ha 0
d2 Coe 1 operat. expenses crop 2 e/ha 0
d3 Coe 1 operat. expenses crop 3 e/ha 0
e1 Coe 2 operat. expenses crop 1 e/ha 908
e2 Coe 2 operat. expenses crop 2 e/ha 780
e3 Coe 2 operat. expenses crop 3 e/ha 1 786
z Maximum pumping cost e/m3 0.02912
c Marginal pumping cost e/m3*m 0.000224
VT Final value of resource e 0
β Discount rate per period unitless 0.05
Table 3: Agronomic, hydrogeologic and economic parameter values for the baseline case.
3.1.2 Yield Response to Water
We compute the yield response to water based on simulation data from the agronomic
PILOTE Model (see Mailhol et al. 2011). The data accounts for the water balance in the
irrigation season (rain, real evapotranspiration (ETR) and irrigation at dierent dates) and
for the yields of dierent types of crops and soil, for the period 1997-2001. We aggregate
data using dierent regressions according to the type of crop, the type of soil and weather
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conditions. Regression results are given in Tables 10-12 in the Appendix. We focus on
results for average/deep soil, which is the most common soil found on specialized sugar
beet farms, and on normal and dry weather conditions. Weather conditions are dened as
a function of ecient rainfall (rain minus real evapotranspiration) and computed for the
most representative crop in each irrigation season, i.e. wheat in spring and sugar beet in
summer. In spring, dry conditions correspond to an ETR ≤ -60 mm and normal conditions
to an ETR between -60 mm and 35 mm. In summer, the dry condition corresponds to an
ETR ≤ -220 mm and normal conditions to an ETR between -220 mm and -120 mm.
We nd that the quadratic relationship between water and yields gives the overall best
results, which is in line with results in the literature (see for example Bozkurt et al. 2006
or Ali 2011 for a survey). We also tested linear and cubic relationships but the t was less
good. Note that we use simulated data as the basis for our regressions. All the scenarios
we use are assumed to be equiprobable. We can therefore compare the goodness of t of
dierent model specications. The values of the regression coecients are listed in table
4.
Coecients Description Unit Values
in a normal year in a dry year
x1 Intercept for wheat ton/ha 9.415315 7.144896
x2 Intercept for barley ton/ha 7.238088 5.876013
x3 Intercept for sugar beet ton/ha 65.02174 42.94781
a1 coef. 1 for wheat ton/m
3 0.0031337 0.0051176
a2 coef. 1 for barley ton/m
3 0.002735 0.004653
a3 coef. 1 for sugar beet ton/m
3 0.0325382 0.0554281
b1 coef. 2 for wheat ton.ha/m
3.m3 0.00000171 0.00000214
b2 coef. 2 for barley ton.ha/m
3.m3 0.00000125 0.00000199
b3 coef. 2 for sugar beet ton.ha/m
3.m3 0.00000743 0.0000141
Table 4: Estimated Coecients of Yield Function for Normal and Dry Year.
3.2 Hydro-geological Data
We use hydro-geological data from Graveline 2013 for the Central Beauce part of the
aquifer. For our study, the withdrawal coecient, the return ow coecient, the aquifer
storage coecient come from Graveline 2013 and water withdrawals for other uses than
irrigation from Lejars et al. 2012b. The water needs of other types of farms in spring
and summer come from Lejars et al. 2012a and the total surface area corresponds to the
Central Beauce part of the aquifer. The initial water table height for the baseline scenario
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is the one recorded in Spring 2010.7 The initial water-table height in our example is thus
0.62 m above the alert threshold. Next, we set the net recharge in summer and spring to
zero, as most recharge takes place in winter. Finally, water-table heights and withdrawals
by other types of farms vary with the scenario. A summary of all these values is presented
in the second part of table 3 and in table 5. All initial water-table heights for restriction
scenarios are under the crisis threshold of 110.75 m NGF. A realistic assumption is that
higher restriction scenarios go with lower initial water-table heights.
Parameters Dry year Quota 20% restrict. 40% restrict. 70% restrict.
H0 92.81 92.81 74.25 55.67 27.84
wjp 97 78 61 47 26
wjs 56 50 36 38 41
Table 5: Initial water-table levels H0 (in m) and irrigation water volumes (in 10
6 m3) for
other farms in spring, wjp, and summer, w
j
s, depending on weather and restriction scenarios.
3.3 Economic Data
We use economic data from several sources, which are summarized in the thrird part of
table 3. Prices for wheat and barley come from the national agency FranceAgriMer (2012)
and price of sugar beet from sugar beet producer organizations (CGB 2009). Operating
expenses come from the farm data-base network ROSACE (2010). Because we do not
have enough data to regress operating expenses on farm area, we attribute all operating
expenses to the quadratic term. Pumping costs correspond to the cost of energy required
to pump water to the topsoil. For typical pump capacities of around 50 m3/h, 0.136 kW is
required to lift one m3 one meter. Considering pump eciencies of 85%8 and energy costs
of 0.07 euros/kWh, we obtain marginal pumping costs of 0.000224 euros/m3*m. For the
largest potential pumping distance (considering the mean surface elevation to be 150 m
above sea level and the deepest point of the aquifer to be 20 m above sea level) we obtain
maximal (marginal) pumping costs of z = 0.02912 euros per m3. Note that we do not
consider neither water taxes or investments or payos for irrigation equipment. Therefore,
our pumping costs correspond to a minimum bound. The nal value of the resource is set to
zero. Indeed, individual farmers do not internalize the consequences of long-term changes
in the water-table. Finally, the discount rate is set at 5% for each period considered.9
7Water-table heights are measured in meters. Referring to the General Levelling of France, 92.81 m
corresponds to 112.81 m NGF because the bottom of the water table is 20 m NGF.
8Personal communication from an expert in the eld. Pump eciencies in the Beauce area are high
compared to those in other areas.
9This corresponds to a double-digit annual discount rate. Empirically elicited discount rates may be
even higher.
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4 Model Results for the Beauce Area
4.1 Results for the Baseline Case: A Normal Year
Variables Description Unit Baseline Dry Year
α1 Share for wheat unitless 0.60 0.56
α2 Share for barley unitless 0.24 0.28
w1 Volume of water for wheat m
3/ha 894 1 178
w2 Volume of water for barley m
3/ha 1 059 1 147
w3 Volume of water for sugar beet m
3/ha 2 167 1 954
w̃ Total water volume m3 138 782 157 800
V (H(0)) Gross annual value-added Euros 89 717 84 043
Mw̃ Total water of sugar beet farms 106 m3 94.23 107.15
H1 Aquifer level by end of spring m 92.09 91.93
H2 Aquifer level by end of summer m 91.67 91.49
H0 −H2 Decrease in the aquifer level m 1.14 1.32
Table 6: Dry year compared to baseline case.
Table 6 (second last column) shows the results of the simulation of the baseline case,
a normal year corresponding to 2010. The representative sugar beet farmer chooses to
allocate 60% of his/her land to wheat and 24% to barley, 16% being used for sugar beet by
assumption. Wheat is irrigated with 894 m3 per hectare, barley with 1 059 m3 per hectare,
and sugar beets with 2 167 m3 per hectare, leading to a total water volume of 138 782
m3 for one farm and 94.23 million m3 for all the eld-crop sugar beet farms. This lowers
the height of the water-table from the initial 92.81 m to 92.09 m by the end of spring and
to 91.67 m by the end of summer. Note that this water-table level (which corresponds to
111.67 m NGF) is above the crisis threshold (110.75 m NGF) that would lead to severe
restrictions. Overall, a representative farm generates a gross annual value added of 89 717
euros.
4.2 Results for a Dry Year
Table 6 compares simulation results for a dry year with the baseline case. Because the
share of the summer crop is xed, 16% of land is still allocated to sugar beet, that is
ᾱ = 0.16. However, the allocation of spring crops changes: compared to the baseline
case, the representative farmer chooses to allocate less land to wheat (56% compared to
60%) and more to barley (28% compared to 24%). The intuition behind this change is that
wheat is more sensitive to drought than barley, because yields are more responsive to water
scarcity. This can be checked by computing the marginal productivity of water (MPW)
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at optimal values, in normal and dry years. First, the MPW value for wheat decreases
by around 70 euros/m3 per ha while the MPW for barley decreases by only around 13
euros/m3. Moreover, the dierence in MPW between wheat and barley is around 346
euros/m3 per ha in a normal year and 288 euros/m3 per ha in a dry year. This explains
the change in the farmers' choice of land-use.
Next, total irrigation water volume increases by 19 000 m3. This is due to an increase
in both wheat and barley irrigation (1178 m3/ha compared to 894 m3/ha for wheat, 1147
m3 /ha compared to 1059 m3/ha for barley), while irrigation for sugar beets is reduced.
The resulting total water volume of a representative farm increases in dry conditions and
amounts to 157 800 m3 (compared to 138 782 m3 in the normal year). This leads to a
bigger drop in the water-table, to 91.49 m by the end of summer (compared to 91.67 m in
the normal year), which corresponds to a drop of 1.32 m. Most of this additional decrease
is due to withdrawals in spring. While in a normal spring, the water-table height was
reduced by 0.72 m, in a dry spring, it is reduced by 0.88 m, i.e. by 0.16 m. Finally, despite
these adaptations, gross annual value-added for the representative farmer decreases only
slightly (by 5 674 euros) from 89 717 euros in the normal year to 84 043 euros in a dry
year.
4.3 Results for a Dry Year With Restriction Policies
We now introduce restriction policies. In the study area, individual quotas are in place.
We rst analyze the case in which the quota restricts the water volume to amounts in
a normal year. Quotas can be changed into restrictions in dry years when the level of
the aquifer is low. Table 7 illustrates how the introduction of these policies changes the
results. We consider four scenarios: the use of quotas alone and restrictions corresponding
to 20%, 40% and 70% of the quotas. Lejars et al. 2012c considered the 40% and the 70%
restrictions as possible for future water policies. Graveline and Mérel 2014 considered 10%
and 30% as policy scenarios in a model on the Beauce aquifer. We hence add the 20%
restriction as a less extreme scenario. In all our restriction scenarios, the initial water-table
levels are set below the crisis threshold, justifying policy intervention.
Let us rst compare results for a dry year without restrictions to results for a dry year
with restriction policies (see Tables 6 and 7). Concerning land use allocation, the use
of policies lead to lower land-use shares allocated to wheat and higher shares to barley.
Land-use shares of sugar beet are xed and hence not adjusted. Concerning the irrigation
strategy, when restriction policies are implemented, the farmer has access to a smaller
total water volume. Priority is then given to the contractual summer crop: sugar beet, for
which a minimum amount of irrigation is required by contract, see Bouarfa et al. 2011.
Optimal results show that volumes for wheat and barley are greatly reduced. With a
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Var. Description Unit Restriction Policies
Quota 20% 40% 70%
α1 Share for wheat unitless 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.53
α2 Share for barley unitless 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31
w1 Volume of water for wheat m
3/ha 1 121 870 621 251
w2 Volume of water for barley m
3/ha 1 077 768 460 3
w3 Volume of water for sugar beet m
3/ha 1 300 1 300 1 300 1 300
w̃ Total water volume m3 138 782 111 025 83 269 41 634
V (H(0)) Gross annual value added Euros 83 811 81 090 75 360 61 175
Mw̃ Total water of sugar beet farms 106 m3 94.23 75.39 56.54 28.27
H0 −H2 Decrease in the aquifer level m 1.14 0.91 0.77 0.56
Table 7: Results of simulation for a dry year with restrictions.
restriction of 20% (respectively 40%) the volume of water for wheat is reduced to 870
(respectively 621) m3 per hectare (compared to 1 178 m3 per hectare without restrictions)
and for barley to 768 (respectively 460) m3 per hectare (compared to 1 147 m3 per hectare
without restriction). The volume of water for barley is reduced more than for wheat, as
wheat requires more water than barley. This is in line with results reported by Graveline
and Mérel 2014. With a restriction of 70%, barley is cultivated under dryland farming
conditions. Indeed, an amount of 3 m3 per hectare is negligible as the volume applied in
one water turn corresponds roughly to 55 m3 per hectare. Overall, water volume reductions
are quite important, ranging for instance between 26% and 33% of dry year amounts in
the 20% restriction scenario. Graveline and Mérel 2014 nd water volume reductions
that are smaller than 9% for a 30% restriction scenario (intensive margin) but report the
move to less water intensive crops (extensive margin) already for 10% and 30% restrictions
scenarios. Overall, total water volumes decrease to 28.27 (75.39 and 56.54) million m3
in the 70% (20% and 40%) restriction scenarios. Not surprisingly, restricting total water
use has a benecial eect on the height of the water-table, which drops by about 0.91
m (0.77 m) with a restriction of 20% (respectively 40%) and by only 0.56 m in the most
extreme scenario. Restrictions lead to changes in water-table levels of 1-2%. However,
such apparently slight variations correspond to large volumes of water, between 0.2 and
0.4 million m3.10 Moreover, repeated withdrawals of 1-2% can lead to substantial drops
in the water-table level over longer time horizons - except when winter recharge is high.
On the other hand, restrictions reduce gross annual value added: compared to the case
in which only quotas apply, gross annual value added is reduced by about 2 721 euros
10For comparison, the distance between the alert threshold and the crisis threshold, which is 1.44 m
corresponds to a 1.28% drop in water-table levels.
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in the least restrictive scenario, 8 451 euros with a 40% restriction, and 22 637 euros
with a 70% restriction. Such losses correspond to 3%, 10% and 27% of the gross annual
value added compared with when only quotas apply. For comparison, Lejars et al. 2012a
found reductions of 10% and 21% of gross production under the 40% and 70% restriction
scenarios, which is very close to our results. In contrast, Graveline and Mérel 2014 report
very moderate reductions in prots for the 30% restriction scenario of a regional Beauce
model. In line with our results, Reynaud 2009 or Bouarfa et al. 2011 nd again important
revenue reductions in their respective case studies. This underlines the fact that although
restrictions adequately preserve groundwater levels, they have a signicant impact on the
farmer's economic situation in the short term, even assuming that he/she adapts optimally
to the dry situation. A policy maker could thus count on abundant winter recharge (which
can exceed 1.5 m in wet years) to avoid too high economic losses for farmers, (see Bruand
et al. 1997 for data on recharge).
To summarize, we can conrm three general features of adaptation in the face of drought
and restriction policies: rst, land-use is aected by a reduction in the share of the most
sensitive crop and an increase in the share of the less sensitive crop. Second, the total
volume of irrigation water for all crops is reduced. Third, in each scenario, lowest water
volumes are allocated to the less productive barley crop, higher volumes to the more water
sensitive wheat crop and highest volumes to the contractual summer crop. We can also
summarize the economic impacts of our simulations. The combined eect of a dry year
and restrictions leads to very serious economic losses for the farmers: for example 10%
(16%) of gross annual value added with a 20% (40%) restriction, corresponding to 8 627
euros (14 357 euros). The quota only policy leads to a loss of 7% of gross annual value
added (or 5 906 euros). The 70% restriction in quota volumes would lead to a 32% loss
of gross annual value added. Concerning the level of the aquifer, restriction policies show
lower aquifers than the baseline case, because initial aquifer levels were intentionally set
very low when stringent restrictions are in place. By assumption, there is no recharge in
spring and summer, and hence no restriction can enable recovery of the resource within
a year. However, we can measure the performance of dierent restriction policies with
respect to the drop in water-table levels they trigger. We can see that the more stringent
the restriction, the smaller the drop in the aquifer level during the irrigation campaign.
This conrms the importance of the implementation of restriction policies to preserve the
resource.
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5 Discussion of Key Parameters
Finally, we need to analyze the importance of dierent parameters in the simulation re-
sults.11 One major limit of the model is the lack of information to estimate the quadratic
function that represents operating costs. As nal results could be driven by the choice of
this cost function, we designed some scenarios with dierent operating cost parameters.
These dierent scenarios are simulated in such a way that the marginal unitary cost per
crop is the same, as can be seen in Table 8.
Var. Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2
d1 = 0 e1 = 908 d1 = 908/3 e1 = 2 ∗ 908/3 d1 = 908/2 e1 = 908/2
d2 = 0 e2 = 780 d2 = 780/3 e2 = 2 ∗ 780/3 d2 = 780/2 e2 = 780/2
d3 = 0 e3 = 1786 d3 = 1786/3 e3 = 2 ∗ 1786/3 d3 = 1786/2 e3 = 1786/2
α1 0.60 0.68 0.73
α2 0.24 0.18 0.11
w1 894 894 894
w2 1 059 1 059 1 059
w3 2 167 2 167 2 167
w̃ 138 782 137 431 136 082
V (H(0)) 89 717 67 266 56 504
Mw̃ 94.23 93.32 92.4
H0 −H2 1.14 1.14 1.14
Table 8: Results accounting for dierent operating costs for each crop.
We observe signicant changes in the share of land allocated to each crop and in the
gross value added obtained by each farmer. For example, in scenario 2 in which the
marginal unitary cost for each crop is shared equally between the linear and quadratic
parameters, the share of land allocated to wheat (respectively to barley) increases (respec-
tively decreases) by 13 points compared with the baseline scenario. Moreover, the gross
value-added decreases by 33 213 euros from the baseline scenario to the second scenario,
which corresponds to an economic loss of 37%. However, the simulation results provide
some hints for the validation of our model. First, total volumes of water used by the farm
do not vary signicantly between scenarios (less than 2%). This implies that changes in
water-table levels are very low between scenarios. Concerning economic outputs, the values
in the baseline scenario are more realistic, as reported in the dierent studies conducted
in the study area (cf. Lejars et al. 2012b,c).
Next, in our analysis, we use estimated parameter values, ak, bk and xk, which contain
11We thank two anonymous referees for discussions on an earlier version of this section.
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Variables Description Unit Baseline Dry Year T-test
α1 Share for wheat unitless 0.60 0.58 **
(0.07) (0.17)
α2 Share for barley unitless 0.24 0.26 **
(0.07) (0.17)
w1 Water volume for wheat m
3/ha 986 1 440 **
(409) (764)
w2 Water volume for barley m
3/ha 1 174 1 401 **
(454) (580)
w3 Water volume for sugar beet m
3/ha 2 225 2 026 **
(608) (436)
w̃ Total water volume m3 154 392 196 985 **
(40 809) (73 219)
V (H(0)) Gross annual value-added Euros 92 381 98 937 **
(8 033) (36 044)
H1 Aquifer level at the end of spring m 92.04 91.81 **
(0.12) (0.23)
H2 Aquifer level at the end of summer m 91.62 91.37 **
(0.13) (0.23)
Table 9: Mean simulated values (with standard errors) and 95% condence intervals in the
T-test comparing sample means. (**) indicates cases where H0 of equal means is rejected.
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uncertainty. We therefore conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameter
values. More precisely, we draw 10000 parameter values in a normal law with standard
errors as estimated in the regressions shown in Tables 10-12. Results for normal and dry
year scenarios12 are given in Table 9.
We can see that land-use changes, as described in our example based on the year
2006, are robust to changes in parameters. Likewise, volumes of water increase for wheat
and barley and decrease for the summer crop in the dry scenario, like in our example.
Moreover, at the end of spring and summer, the levels of the aquifer are signicantly lower
under dry conditions than in a normal year. However, gross annual value added according
to the uncertainty analysis is greater in a dry year than in a normal year, in contrast to
our example. This is probably due to a greater decrease in the yield of the contractual
summer crop in our example. Results for the total water volumes are also robust as there
is an increase in the dry scenario compared to the normal scenario. The implementation
of restriction policies in dry years are then justied.
Finally, we ran other simulations with dierent values for prices, pumping costs and
parameters of the dynamics of the resource.13 For example cereal crop prices are key
parameters in the economic model. Increasing the price of barley above that of wheat leads
to a signicant decrease in the share of land allocated to wheat (- 20 points). Doubling
cereal prices leads to higher revenues (+ 128 points), but does not inuence the state of the
aquifer at the end of summer. Doubling the price of sugar beet leads to higher irrigation
water volumes used for this crop. Results are less sensitive to an increase in pumping costs.
Pumping costs have to be multiplied by at least ten to result in signicant changes in the
water volumes used and revenues obtained. Finally, a variation in hydrological parameters,
for example in water volumes applied by other users or the total surface area of the study
area, does not impact individual irrigation and land-use choices but plays an important
role in aquifer levels.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the impact of dry weather conditions and restriction policies in
the Beauce aquifer in France. To this end, we built a dynamic hydro-agro-economic model
to simulate the choice of land-use and irrigation volumes made by farmers. We needed a
dynamic model because we wanted to assess restriction policies that apply in spring and
in summer, but which the farmers learn about and take into account at the beginning
of spring. The dynamic eect is not very large in our model, because pumping costs are
12Sensitivity analyses have also been made for results of the dry year scenarios with restriction policies
in Table 6. Results of these analyses are available from authors upon request.
13More detailed results are available upon request.
21
Author-produced version of the article published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2016, N°44(1), p.99-120.
The original publication is available at http://erae.oxfordjournals.org
Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbw005
very low and the aquifer is very large. If the model were to be used in other study areas,
the dynamic eect would be increasingly relevant. However, with large surface areas, like
Central Beauce, small drops in the level of the water-table lead to major reductions in
water volumes and may harm the whole agricultural sector. Specically, the estimated
1% to 2% drops in the level of the water table during the irrigation period correspond to
water volumes of between 0.2 and 0.4 million m3. The main contribution of the paper is
assessing the impact of dry weather conditions and water restrictions on farmers' decisions
concerning optimal land-use and irrigation. We rst consider a dry year scenario, in which
there is an increase in water demand. We then consider a dry year scenario with dierent
restriction policies. We show that, rst, land-use strategies in the face of droughts consist in
decreasing the share of the most sensitive crop and increasing the share of the less sensitive
crop. Second, total irrigation water volumes may increase in absence of restrictions but
are reduced when restrictions are implemented. Third, in the case of restrictions, water
volumes are reduced in quite important proportions (with reduction greater than 26%).
Fourth, with restrictions, lowest water volumes are allocated to the less productive barley
crop, higher volumes to the more water sensitive wheat crop and highest volumes to the
contractual summer crop. Lastly, we show that the combined eect of a dry period and
restriction policies results in signicant losses for farmers, which can reach 16% of gross
value-added for a high but not implausible 40% limitation on water use and up to 32%
for drastic restrictions of 70%. The order of magnitude of these losses is in line with
other studies on the Beauce aquifer, see for example Bouarfa et al. 2011 or Lejars et al.
2012a. Hence, the implementation of restriction policies comes at a cost, which our model
can assess. To conclude, although restriction policies are a satisfactory way of preserving
water-table levels, they can lead to serious economic losses for farmers in the short term.
To avoid such losses to farmers, a policy maker could count on abundant winter recharge.
In wet winters, recharge can exceed 1.5 m (see Bruand et al. 1997), which results in higher
water-table levels the following spring than initial levels, whatever the restriction scenario
considered in the current year. However, as the Beauce aquifer is characterized by low
winter recharges, this scenario is rather unlikely. Our results thus imply important future
challenges for policy makers in our study area.
Several extensions of this work are possible: First, we could improve the dynamic
model by considering more than two periods and a more complex crop rotation system.
In addition, we could introduce uncertainty and show how a farmer can cope with it.
Moreover, we could assume farmers are risk averse, for example by including farmers who
minimize the variance of outcomes. Finally, we could introduce dierent types of farmers
and the interactions between them, and focus especially on how they learn about their
respective behaviors.
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Appendix
Table 10: Yield-water response for wheat and average/deep soil
Dry weather conditions
Variable Coecient Std.error t Value P> |t| 95% Conf. interval
w 0.0051176 0.0012194 4.20 0.000 [0.0027036, 0.0075315]
w squared -2.14e-06 9.86e-07 -2.17 0.032 [-4.09e-06, -1.87e-06]
const. 7.144896 0.3032466 23.56 0.000 [6.544589, 7.545203]
Number of observations: 125. Adjusted R-squared 0.3071
Normal weather conditions
Variable Coecient Std.error t Value P> |t| 95% Conf. interval
w 0.0031337 0.0005348 5.86 0.000 [0.0020779, 0.0041895]
w squared -1.71e-06 4.76e-07 -3.60 0.000 [-2.65e-06, -7.71e-07]
const. 9.415315 0.1214989 77.49 0.000 [9.175474, 9.655156]
Number of observations: 173. Adjusted R-squared 0.2750
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Table 11: Yield-water response for barley and average/deep soil
Dry weather conditions
Variable Coecient Std.error t Value P> |t| 95% Conf. interval
w 0.004653 0.0007293 6.38 0.000 [0.0032086, 0.0060974]
w squared -1.99e-06 6.00e-07 -3.32 0.001 [-3.18e-06, -8.01e-07]
const. 5.876013 0.1789212 32.84 0.000 [5.521637, 6.231389]
Number of observations: 119. Adjusted R-squared 0.5088
Normal weather conditions
Variable Coecient Std.error t Value P> |t| 95% Conf. interval
w 0.002735 0.0003649 7.50 0.000 [0.002014, 0.0034559]
w squared -1.25e-06 3.57e-07 -3.50 0.001 [-1.95e-06, -5.44e-07]
const. 7.238088 0.0763662 94.78 0.000 [7.087203, 7.388972]
Number of observations: 154. Adjusted R-squared 0.4916
Table 12: Yield-water response for sugar beet and average/deep soil
Dry weather conditions
Variable Coecient Std.error t Value P> |t| 95% Conf. interval
w 0.0554281 0.0048382 11.46 0.000 [0.00458902, 0.064966]
w squared -0.0000141 2.83e-06 -4.97 0.000 [-0.0000196, -8.48e-06]
const. 42.94781 1.710531 25.11 0.000 [39.57571, 46.31992]
Number of observations: 212. Adjusted R-squared 0.7105
Normal weather conditions
Variable Coecient Std.error t Value P> |t| 95% Conf. interval
w 0.0325382 0.004551 7.15 0.000 [0.023583, 0.0414934]
w squared -7.43e-06 2.88e-06 -2.58 0.010 [-0.0000131, -1.75e-06]
const. 65.02174 1.462459 44.46 0.000 [62.14399, 67.89948]
Number of observations: 309. Adjusted R-squared 0.4112
27
Author-produced version of the article published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2016, N°44(1), p.99-120.
The original publication is available at http://erae.oxfordjournals.org
Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbw005
